[ILUG] E-voting in India

[Thomas Pedoussaut]

Colm MacCarthaigh wrote:
> On Wed, May 05, 2004 at 12:20:12PM +0100, Thomas Pedoussaut wrote:
> 
>>Booting off Read Only support like a CD Rom, that has been pressed and 
>>physically/visually signed ?
> 
> 
> And how do you verify the contents of it?
At the moment of vote, you can't, but you can later because, read 3 {} 
later, the disks are collected and stored with the poll material for 
further scrutiny. (It's a mix with Vincent suggestion of Nevada Gaming 
Commission.

> 
> 
>>At the end of boot, the machine, within a transparent cell, ejects the 
>>CD so every voter can see the disk.
>>
>>Disks are then collected at the end of the poll for further 
>>investigation in case of litigation.
>>
>>Data are collected into one / two USB keys that are physically removed 
>>from each machine. Put into separate containers for later count.
> 
> 
> Actually having USB available at all is one of the biggest security 
> problems in the whole affair. 
Not if you put the machine within a sealed transparent container, like 
the poll box.

>>Any citizen can visually follow the process of counting.
 > How?

Any key can have a white label signed by one/two polling officer the 
morning of the poll.

Those keys are transported into the counting station where results are 
displayed on a per key basis and computed into a second serie of key.

And you start the mechanisme at each level, with public scrutiny of the 
results.

Each time, producing a pair of keys. A random one is used for counting, 
the second stored for further scrutiny. For carrying keys, you can used 
tamper-evident containers carried by 2 different people.
-- 
Thomas Pedoussaut
Dublin IRLANDE
http://irlande.staffeurs.org/